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On July 15, 2010, the US Senate passed legislationaimed at promoting financial stability. Among theaims of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act 2010 (HR4173 –“Wall Street Reform
2010”), which was signed into law on July 21, is the
promotion of financial stability by enhanced accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end bailouts,
and consumer protection from abusive financial services
practices. In addition, the Wall Street Reform 2010 will
seek to (a) increase the scope of the Federal Reserve; (b)
address the key issue of effective insolvency arrangements
in the context of “large, interconnected financial
institutions; (c) improve regulation of over-the-counter
derivatives and hedge funds; (d) seek to improve regulation
of bank and savings association holding companies and
depository institutions; (e) create an Office of National
Insurance; and (f) provide increased shareholder rights for
executive compensation and corporate governance.
This legislation remains one of the most significant
enactments in financial systems and regulation to date. Not
only does this mark an important national legislative and
regulatory advance, it further provides instructive insights
into international approaches and advances inter alia in the
areas of financial stability, insurance regulation and
systemic risk management and related institutional and
regulatory capacity in these areas.
The most potentially significant institutional changes of
Wall Street Reform 2010 include the introduction of a
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in Title 1, an
Office of National Insurance within the Treasury (Title V) and
a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to be located
within the Federal Reserve (Title X).
It is evident from the recent financial crisis that the need
to achieve better understanding, oversight and assessment
of systemic risk in the financial system – not fragmented on
a sectoral or industry level – is an important area of
regulatory reform needed to enhance the resilience of the
financial system and protect against financial crises of
similar origins as the recent crisis. The proposed US
framework, in particular the introduction of the FSOC to
address comprehensively risk in the financial system,
recognises and highlights the importance and key role of
systemic risk in the new regulatory approach – in policy-
making, regulatory frameworks and institutional design. It
also raises parallels with the approaches of other countries
in addressing this key regulatory challenge.
This article seeks to address recent legislative and
regulatory changes in the US in the area of systemic risk
management and to assess the impact of the changes on
financial market supervision. It also addresses changes to
the regulation of insurance markets, the enhancements to
systemic risk monitoring and the effectiveness of the
proposed consumer protection bureau.
SYSTEMIC RISK
The term “systemic risk” has during the recent crisis
been widely used as a popular term in the regulatory
reform debate. Despite the concept of systemic risk being
broadly acknowledged as a key area for policy reform,
there is a need to clearly define its meaning to avoid
ambiguity over the concept and to fully understand its role
and relevance in contributing to the crisis and in the
reforms. Systemic risk is inextricably intertwined with the
concept of contagion in the financial markets and could be
described as the domino effect that single event failures or
weaknesses in the financial sector could have on the
broader system, or alternatively the translation of
weaknesses in one sector on different sectors or
institutions – and beyond the potential impact (of such
events and weaknesses) on the broad financial sector and
on the national and global economy.
Traditionally, systemic risk has been most closely
identified with regulation of the banking system. This has
however been changed by a number of factors including
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the evolution of the financial markets, the globalisation of
finance and the shared commercial context in which
financial institutions operate and for which financial
instruments can be now employed. Consequently, risks
formerly associated with and assumed as being contained
within a distinct area of the financial system may now arise
from different financial institutions and sources, and
systemic risk has broader significance throughout the
financial sector. It therefore needs to be addressed in the
context of the banking, insurance and securities industries
while maintaining a focus on consumer protection
objectives.
As finance has outpaced regulation in its evolution and
development, instruments such as guarantees, credit
default swaps and reinsurance products may in
international financial transactions be employed by
financial institutions to perform commercial functions in
the transactional market. Given this parallel, when similar
products are subjected to distinct regulatory treatment and
supervisory oversight, weaknesses on a system wide level
could be more difficult or take longer to perceive from a
regulatory perspective and result in delayed corrective
policy actions. Thus, systemic risk needs to be considered
and understood in its commercial context and with related
financial sector and economic implications.
OVERSIGHT OF SYSTEMIC RISK UNDER
THE NEW LAW
The US framework makes several far-reaching changes
to the current regulatory approach, institutional design,
allocation of responsibility and decision-making in
supervisory and policy terms. One of the fundamental
changes of the new legislation is the introduction of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council, the role of which is
broadly comparable to the European Systemic Risk
Council (ESRC) to be introduced in the European Union.
The FSOC shall consist of both voting members and
non-voting members. It shall comprise the Secretary of the
Treasury as chairperson, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (to be formed under the new law), the
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Chairperson of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing
Finance Agency and an independent member with
insurance expertise. The legislation also provides for the
Director of the Office of Financial Research, (to also be
introduced under Wall Street Reform) to serve in an
advisory capacity as a non-voting member.
The purposes of the Financial Stability Oversight Council
are three-fold (s 112):
1. The identification of risks to the financial stability of
the United States that could arise from “the material
financial distress or failure of large, interconnected
bank holding companies or nonbank financial
companies”;
2. the promotion of market discipline by eliminating
expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors
and counterparties of such companies” that, in the
event of a failure, the Government will shield them;
and;
3. to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the
United States financial markets.
The proposal not only represents a major institutional
change in the US financial and regulatory structure but
further brings to the fore new regulatory and policy
considerations in addition to those it seeks to resolve. One
such example arises from the representation for the
insurance sector at the FSOC by [the designation of] an
“independent member.” This highlights the state-by-state
system of regulation for the insurance industry and the need
to address the fragmented supervisory structure at present
employed for oversight of the insurance sector (It is
noteworthy that the “state insurance authority in which an
insurance company is domiciled” is designated under the
Wall Street Reform 2010 as the “primary financial
regulatory authority” – s 2(11)(D)). With the persistence
of a state-by-state system of supervision, not only is there no
national body with over-arching broad national oversight of
risks, trends and vulnerabilities in the insurance market to
convene with other national sector representatives, but this
also poses a potential obstacle for future international co-
ordination for the insurance industry in the United States.
Second, the FSOC’s ambit as the identification of risks
to financial stability that could potentially arise from “the
material financial distress or failure of large,
interconnected bank holding companies or non-bank
financial companies” (s 112(a)(1)(A)) is arguably more
restrictive in terms of scope than it could be. In particular,
the provision of the FSOC with broader, far-reaching and
general systemic risk management powers could provide
this body with wider powers to assess threats to financial
stability whether or not arising from large banking and
non-banking financial institutions. It is arguable that in the
current state of global finance, all institutions are to some
degree inter-connected – hence the importance of
assessing translation and sharing of risks within the system.
In particular, potentially disruptive risks may emerge from
smaller institutions. It is important to avoid the assumption
that institutional size may bear a direct correlation to the
probability and scope of threats of financial stability. While
it is safe to assume that larger institutions may exert a more
significant market influence, this is not always the case and
account must be taken of the potential for smaller
institutions and a variety of other factors to also be the
source of risks to financial stability. Therefore, the question
arises as to whether the FSOC is intended to identify only
major institutional failures – and the possible impact on
the system from this, or broader risks to the financial22
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system whether or not arising from this particular sort of
failure.
Third, it is unclear how the proposals eliminate the
expectations on the part of shareholders and creditors that
the government shall shield them in the event of failures.
While increased financial stability would evidently be
intended to reduce the occurrence of failure events, this
issue could be treated separately from that of the
government’s response and level of support in the wake of
such events. Failure events, while undesirable in financial
stability terms, cannot be entirely eliminated. Such an
expectation would be unrealistic, and, more importantly,
an inappropriate measure of the success of the FSOC. The
promotion of financial stability is an important objective in
its own right which hopefully will reduce the likelihood of
financial institution failures. However, the burden of
providing support in the event of such failures is a matter
that may best be treated separately, whether as an issue of
industry-funded support mechanisms or other policy
responses.
Fourth, the FSOC has the ability under the legislation to
require both US and foreign non-bank financial
institutions to be supervised by the Federal Reserve. In the
former case, this may occur in the event of “material
financial distress” that could pose a threat to national
financial stability, and in the case of foreign non-bank
financial institutions where such entities have “substantial
US assets or operations” and their financial distress may
also pose a threat to US financial stability. The scope of the
Council’s power in these circumstances represents the
significantly heightened powers granted to the Federal
Reserve under the law, as well as raising the extra-
territorial implications of enabling the Council to require
foreign non-bank institutions to be subject to prudent
standards and supervision by the Federal Reserve.
Fifth, it is clear that the FSOC shall be engaged in
identifying potentially disruptive areas of risk but that its
role shall have a broader policy function including
respondingto such threats by making policy
recommendations to primary financial regulators (s
112(a)(1)(C)). The latter carries with it a range of further
implications. The legislation is both comprehensive and
forward-looking in that it maintains the primary
jurisdiction of existing regulators and thereby reinforces
the delicate balance of micro-prudential supervision to be
conducted by primary financial regulators, and macro-
prudential oversight to be exercised by the Council.
OTHER CHANGES INTRODUCED BY THE
NEW FRAMEWORK
The reforms seek to comprehensively reflect the
concern in modern-day finance over systemic risk arising
from disparate and non-traditional areas of the financial
system. One important way in which it seeks to provide a
system-wide approach to risk is by the requirement for
centralised clearing of standardised derivative contracts.
This recognises the commercial and regulatory possibility
for systemic risk to arise in complex derivative markets and
in the broader wholesale capital markets. Further, the
Volcker Rule prohibits banks from investing more than 6
per cent of their capital in proprietary trading and from
using deposit money to be invested in hedge funds or
private equity.
The establishment of the Office of National Insurance
(“ONI”) is another significant institutional change
introduced by the new legislation. Its responsibilities shall
include:
• monitoring all aspects of the insurance industry
(including identifying issues or gaps in the regulation
of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in
the insurance industry or the financial system);
• provision of recommendations to the FSOC on the
designation of an insurer, as an entity subject to
regulation as a nonbank financial company supervised
by the Board of Governors;
• provision of assistance in administration of the
Terrorism Insurance Programme;
• coordination of federal efforts and development of
federal policy on prudential aspects of
international insurance matters;
• conduct of consultation with the states (including
state insurance regulators) regarding insurance matters
of national importance and prudential insurance
matters of international importance;
• performance of such other related duties and
authorities as may be assigned to the Office by the
Secretary.
The ONI shall advise the Secretary on major domestic
and prudential international insurance policy issues and
the legislation provides for the conduct of a study to be
submitted to Congress on modernisation of US insurance
regulation. This shall include consideration of systemic risk
regulation in insurance, consumer protection for insurance
products and practices (including gaps in state regulation),
the degree of national uniformity of state insurance
regulation, consolidated regulation of insurance companies
and affiliates, and international coordination of insurance
regulation.
While the ONI does not at present have a role on the
FSOC, its introduction recognises the importance of
greater harmonisation, co-ordination and consistency at
the national level of legislation, regulatory policy and
supervision of insurance entities. The proposed study
envisaged by the legislation may be viewed as a precursor to
greater federal supervision in this sector and
harmonisation of insurance regulatory frameworks,
thereby enhancing risk management and eliminating
inconsistencies which do not serve well for the assessment
of national systemic risk and could be exacerbated by the 23
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current system of state authorities and divergent
frameworks.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it appears that the treatment of systemic
risk in the financial system will be significantly enhanced by
the enactments of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010. The effectiveness of the Act in
increasing surveillance of system-wide risk and providing
more centralised oversight will facilitate timely, targeted
policy responses, and this is indicated by the degree of
integration and reflection of systemic risk management
throughout the proposals and regulatory institutions. The
Act will have an effect beyond providing a greater degree of
regulatory information as to such risk in a way that will
provide useful monitoring of weaknesses in the financial
system and the possibility of averting future crises; the
impact of Wall Street Reform 2010 on the current
structure for financial institution governance in the US is
likely to result in a less fragmented regulatory design, and
greater concentration of supervisory control in the Federal
Reserve.
The passing of Wall Street Reform 2010 is a clear
recognition of the need to address in regulatory terms the
cross-border nature of finance, risk and international
financial transactions, to afford due consideration for
issues of systemic risk throughout the financial system, and
address stability, risk and contagion on national and
regional levels. While the measures will provide enhanced
surveillance and stability for financial markets, the true
effectiveness of Wall Street Reform lies in the faithfulness
of its implementation by national regulatory agencies in the
US. Ultimately, an international co-ordinating mechanism
in this area of financial stability would provide a greater
measure of global oversight and offer the possibility of
averting significant future global financial crises in
circumstances where the appropriate exchange of
information and risk analysis could allow for timely policy
actions, appropriate interventions and global policy co-
ordination.
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